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CORPORATE SUCCESSORS UNDER STRICT
LIABILITY: A GENERAL ECONOMIC THEORY AND
THE CASE OF CERCLA
Merritt B. Fox*
INTRODUCTION

P undertakes an activity subject to strict liability that creates a risk
of harm to others. The activity harms V. Before the harm becomes apparent, however, P sells its assets to S for cash and dissolves. Should V be
entitled to compensation from S in P's stead? If the talk of corporate
lawyers is to be believed, concern over this seemingly technical question
is having a substantial impact on the salability of billions of dollars of
productive assets.
With the growth of products liability litigation, state courts have
given the issue of successor liability increasing attention over the last decade. With the campaign to clean up the nation's tens of thousands of
hazardous waste sites, successor liability has also become important for
the federal courts as they have begun to deal with suits arising under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act1 (CERCLA or the Superfund law). CERCLA imposes strict liability
on a variety of "responsible parties" for the costs of these cleanups. The
Environmental Protection Agency has gone so far as to claim that any
corporate successor of such a "responsible party" is also liable under
CERCLA as long as the successor continues substantially the same business operations.2
This Article develops an economic analysis of successor liability. Part
I sets out a simple approach to the problem based on two basic assumptions: Everyone possesses the same information, and all firms act to maximize share value. Looking at the point in time when the firm decides its
method and level of production, the model shows how strict liability promotes the efficient allocation of resources and risk and how awareness of
the possibility of the firm later selling its assets and dissolving undermines strict liability's effectiveness at promoting efficiency. Successor liability is shown to be, given the assumptions, a complete and essentially
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, Ph.D.
(Economics) 1980, Yale University. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Alfred Conard, Avery Katz, James Krier and Thomas Ulen, each of whom read an
earlier draft of this article and offered helpful comments. The author also acknowledges,
with thanks, the research assistance of Daniel Hurley. Financial support for this project was
provided by the Cook Fund of the University of Michigan Law School.
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
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costless antidote.
Part II takes a second look at the problem, dropping the assumption
of uniform information. One ramification is to permit the development of
a richer model of firm behavior than the one the share value maximization assumption implied. I suggest that with the changed assumption
there is a big difference between the way management takes account of
input costs and output revenues and the way it takes account of the possibilities both of liability and of a sale of assets and dissolution that relieves liability. Management can be expected to be better informed about,
and deal more rationally with, the first set of factors than the second. As
a result, successor liability, while still beneficial, plays a less important
role in the efficiency of strict liability story than it does under the assumption of uniform information.
Part III considers the cost of a rule imposing successor liability when
the assumption of uniform information is dropped: the blocking of a certain number of asset transfers from less to more productive hands. It will
be seen that imposition of successor liability in many ways resembles
piercing the corporate veil. In a world of uniform information, protecting
shareholders from a corporation's liabilities, like shielding a successor,
simply undermines the effectiveness of tort law for promoting the efficient allocation of resources. When shareholders know less than management, the antidote-unlimited shareholder liability-carries with it
considerable costs.3
Part IV pulls together the threads of the preceding discussion to develop a general approach for answering the question when, if ever, a successor should be liable. Both the nature of the activity subject to strict
liability and the particular transaction's characteristics are relevant. I
then apply this general approach to the question of successor liability
under CERCLA. I conclude that, measured against the base line of traditional state products liability law, the case for vigorously expanding successor liability under CERCLA is weak. If the federal courts conclude
that the traditional state law base line is inappropriate because most
state courts have been too timid, the federal courts should expand successor liability under CERCLA in directions that, compared to the expansions of the most adventurous state courts, take better account of the
benefits and costs of applying successor liability to different classes of
transactions.
Throughout the paper, the discussion will primarily be in terms of P,
S, and V, as sketched out above. In order to isolate the salient factors, the
discussion will proceed under assumptions that permit the strongest possible case to be made for strict liability's efficiency. Thus, assume that V's
harm is large compared to V's wealth. V, like everyone else, is risk averse.
V cannot obtain insurance to cover the harm. V can do nothing to reduce
the likelihood of being harmed. All inputs and outputs are sold in com-

REV.

3. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Cm. L.
89 (1985).
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petitive markets. P cannot go bankrupt, so limited liability is not an issue. Finally, there are no externalities in the economy other than the risk
of harm to others resulting from P's activity.

1. A

SIMPLE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

The simple economic analysis of the successor liability problem
presented here rests on two fundamental assumptionsf The first assumption is that every participant in the economy possesses the same information and, though lacking perfect foresight, knows the probability of all
possible future events. P's management, its shareholders, and any potential purchaser of P's assets would, for example, all agree on the
probability that an act of the firm would cause future harm to third parties and, if the firm were always required to provide compensation, the
act's effect on share value. The second assumption is that P's management acts to maximize current share value. Current share value equals
the present value of the aggregate expected future stream of dividends
and other distributions accruing to the shareholders.

A. Strict Liability: An Efficiency Analysis
As I will demonstrate below, imposing strict liability on an activity
connected with the production of a firm's output will, under the assumptions I have made, promote two important social goals: the efficient allocation of resources and the efficient allocation of risk.
1. Efficient allocation of resources
P participates in society's allocation of scarce resources when P decides how to produce its output and what amount to produce. P maximizes its contribution to society when it chooses (1) the method of
production that involves the least social cost and (2) the level of output
where marginal social cost just equals the price consumers will pay. These
are the exact choices that a producer maximizing share value and selling
its output in a competitive market will make if its private costs (the debits to its net revenue stream) equal the social costs of its production.
The social costs of some aspects of its production process-for example, the use of scarce labor and materials that otherwise would be available to produce other things-are automatically private costs because the
firm must purchase them in competitive markets. Risk of harm to other
persons, however, while clearly also a social cost of production, is a private cost only if the liability regime governing the activity forces the firm
to pay for any harm that occurs.
Imposing strict liability on P for an activity turns the social cost of
all the resulting risk of harm to others into a private cost as well. As a
profit maximizer, P seeks the method of production that minimizes total
4. As readers familiar with economic analyses will recognize, these are standard assumptions employed in many simple economic models.
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private costs. Strict liability therefore ensures that the production
method that P chooses will minimize social costs as well. 11 This results in
the producer exercising due care-employing available precautions that
reduce expected harm to others up to the point where the cost of implementing them equals the reduction in the expected cost of the harm. Of
course, any risk of harm to others that could not be cost-effectively eliminated would remain. Including this remaining risk of harm to others in
P's private costs will affect the level of output choice at which P maximizes its profits. 6 Assuming that the remaining risk of harm is a positive
function of output, its inclusion as a private cost will raise P's marginal
cost curve. The level of output at which private marginal cost equals price
will thus be lower than it would be if the risk of harm were not included
in private cost. This lower level of output represents a more efficient allocation of resources: For each additional unit, the value of what society
gains as measured by its price is less than the value of what society gives
up to produce it (the value of other products that otherwise could be produced plus the added expected harm to others).

2. Efficient allocation of risk
In addition to promoting the efficient allocation of resources, imposing strict liability will also promote an efficient reallocation of the remaining risk of loss.

a. The concept of risk and its relation to strict liability. It is important to understand at the outset what the term "risk" means. Many
future events cannot be predicted with certainty. For example, it may be
impossible for a current observer to know exactly the extent of future
damage to others, if any, from burying a given toxic chemical in a particular dump site. Instead, an observer may have a sense of the probability
of each of a range of different possible outcomes: the probability distribution. The typical central best guess figure to summarize this range of possible outcomes-the "expected harm"-is the mean or expected value of
the probability distribution: the probabilistically weighted average of the
different possible levels of resulting harm. In contrast, risk relates to the
possible variability in outcome, that is, how far the actual amount of
damage is expected to deviate, one way or the other, from the best guess
figure or mean. A common measure of risk is the variance of the
5. This assumes there were no other social costs that were not private costs as well.
6. Including this remaining risk of harm in P's private cost is what, under my assumptions, makes strict liability superior to negligence in terms of efficient allocation of resources. If P were operating under a negligence regime, it would not be constrained in its
choice of output level by a fear of liability. As long as P exercised due care in its choice of
method, it would not be liable for the remaining risk. See S. SHAVELL, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 21-24 (1987).
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probability distribution.
Imposing strict liability on P for an activity has, at least in the first
instance, two effects. First, it involves a wealth transfer from P (or, if P
can pass the expected cost on to its customers in higher prices, P's customers) to the potential victims: Rather than the victims, P must bear
the expected damage costs from the activity. Second, rather than the victims, P and ultimately those individuals in the economy whose wealth
depends on P's fortunes, 7 must bear the risk (the variability in outcome).
As I will discuss below, bearing risk is a cost because the typical individual would prefer a given level of certain future wealth to a range of possible wealth levels with the same expected value.
With strict liability, P (and ultimately the individuals whose wealth
depends on P's fortunes) will bear the risk from variation even when P is
able to pass the expected damage costs on to the customers purchasing
the units whose production generates the risk of loss. P will still be the
one that will have to pay out damages for the harms that actually materialize. For example, if P anticipates damage claims of $X for producing Y
units, and includes in the price of each unit $X/Y, it still faces the risk
that the damage payout will differ from X. The expectation of the difference between expected and actual payout is exactly what risk entails, and
so it is P that retains the risk. 8
In framing my general problem, I assumed that P's activity threatens
others with the possibility of harm that will be large compared to the
typical victim's wealth. Since the potential victims, like all other individuals in the economy, are assumed to be risk averse (money having declining marginal utility to them), in the absence of strict liability the risk
they bear would be a substantial burden. The individuals whose wealth
depends on P's fortunes are also risk averse. Nevertheless, imposing strict
liability on P can still reduce the total expected risk related costs to society arising from P's activity. 9 This is because strict liability permits both
a pooling and a sharing of the risks that would otherwise be borne entirely by potential victims.

b. Risk pooling. The first way that holding P responsible for any
eventual losses improves risk allocation is through the pooling of risks. To
understand the concept of pooling and how it increases the efficiency of
7. These individuals are primarily P's shareholders (or, to the extent that P has institutional shareholders, their shareholders or beneficiaries), but they may include as well
other "stakeholders" of P such as its management, employees, and the individuals whose
wealth in turn depends on the fortunes of P's creditors and suppliers.
8. P, of course, may be able to relieve itself of this risk by purchasing insurance, but
that represents a second risk shifting transaction.
9. This focus on reducing a potentially harmful activity's risk-related costs bears a
resemblance to Calabresi's concept of "secondary" accident cost reduction. The concern
with risk allocation is not with the potential amount of harm the activity generates but with
the potential social costs resulting from that harm. G. CALABRESI, CosT OF ACCIDENTS 26-27,
39-41 (1970).
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risk allocation, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose that P uses a
process that for each unit of output creates a .001 risk of a toxic chemical
release that will do $10,000 of damage to a single individual. The expected damage per unit produced is therefore $10. This risk is independent of the risk of release associated with the production of any other
unit. P chooses to produce 100,000 units, making the expected number of
releases 100 and the aggregate expected damage $1,000,000. If there is no
compensation, potential victims face the bipolar possibilities of either no
loss or a loss large compared to their personal wealth. If the producer has
to pay compensation, however, it can be reasonably certain that any
deviation from the expected $1,000,000 payment will be relatively small. 10
Most of the variability in outcome has been eliminated. To the extent
that a shareholder holds P's shares as part of a highly diversified portfolio
of investments, his derivative portion of P's risk will be further pooled
with all the unsystematic risks affecting his other investments and in the
process largely eliminated. 11
c. Risk sharing. Many situations do not resemble the example just
discussed where P's process is likely to generate a substantial number of
independent harms. Nevertheless, making P responsible for the losses can
still improve risk allocation because it permits the sharing of risks. Consider this alternative example. P uses a process that for each unit of output creates a .000001 risk of a toxic chemical release that will do
$10,000,000 of damage to a single individual. The expected damage per
unit produced is therefore also $10, and the risk is again independent of
the risk of release associated with the production of any other unit. P still
chooses to produce 100,000 units, and so again the aggregate expected
damage is $1,000,000. But the nature of this risk is very different. There
is a little more than a 90% chance that there will be no chemical release,
a bit less than a 10% chance that there will be one release with a single
individual suffering a $10,000,000 harm, and a very small chance of more
than one release. 13 Therefore, pooling will do almost nothing to reduce
risk. Efficiency gains through a strict liability regime are still possible,
however, through risk sharing.

The idea that spreading the risk of this loss among many people represents a more efficient allocation of whatever risk cannot be eliminated
by pooling is a bit more complex than it may initially appear based on the
10. An analogy can be made here to coin flipping. In one game, the player flips a silver
dollar. If it is heads, he keeps the dollar; if it is tails, he keeps nothing. In the second game,
the player flips 100 pennies. He can keep the pennies that come up heads but not those that
come up tails. The expected value of playing each game is $.50. The variability in outcome
from the first game-either getting a dollar or nothing-is much higher than in the second
game, where the actual outcome is very likely to be within a few pennies of $.50.
11. In the language of portfolio theory, P's risk of loss would be firm-specific and unsystematic, that is, independent of factors affecting the market for securities as a whole.
12. The probability of no harmful releases is .999999100, 000, or .9048. The probability of
a single harmful release is 100,000 x .000001 x .999999°0 , 09 •, or .0905. The remaining possibility, that there will be more than one release, is thus 1 - (.9048 + .0905) = .0047.
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traditional discussion of the virtues of strict liability. A centerpiece argument in this traditional discussion is the idea that a large loss split among
many people involves less aggregate pain than if it is concentrated on a
single person. 13 The argument starts with the widely held assumption
that most people derive declining marginal utility from wealth. That is,
their last dollar is worth less to them than the dollar before it, and so on.
However, the argument goes on to a second, more controversial step. This
involves the intuition that because of near universal declining marginal
utility from wealth, splitting a loss improves social welfare by taking the
last few less valuable dollars from many people instead of the more valuable earlier dollars that the injured party would give up if he bore the loss
wholly by himself. This intuition may well be correct and certainly has
motivated much tort policy. But its ex post focus on the allocation of
losses after harm has appeared is inappropriate for a policy formulated
prior to the materialization of harm. The ex ante issue is the allocation of
risk of loss, not loss.
This intuition is also not a supportable proposition in welfare economics, because it implicitly involves an assumption that X and Y have
similar utility functions, an interpersonal comparison that a welfare economist would argue cannot be verified. X and Y might both display declining marginal utility from wealth, valuing their last dollar far less than
their first, but Y might still value his last dollar more than X values his
first. X's splitting a loss with Y that would otherwise fall wholly on X
would then lower, rather than raise, their joint welfare.
Unlike sharing of loss after it occurs, however, sharing of risks in advance of possible loss can be shown to increase efficiency even without
making interpersonal comparisons. The starting point is the standard
analysis of the relationship between declining marginal utility and risk
aversion. If an individual has declining marginal utility from wealth, one
thousand dollars more adds less to his total utility than one thousand
dollars less subtracts from his total utility. This leads to risk aversion
because, compared to the expected utility from a given level of wealth
known with certainty, the chance of being one thousand dollars over that
level does not compensate for an equal chance of being one thousand dollars under that level. Thus, variability in outcome is a "bad." There is a
certain amount of wealth affecting variability in the economy that cannot
be eliminated by pooling, and this variability must be borne by someone.
The question of risk sharing is how to allocate this variability efficiently.
i. A simple model of the sharing of an exogenous risk of loss. To
see how sharing risk can as a general matter increase efficiency, consider
first the following simple model where the loss involved is an exogenous
event, not the result of P's actions in response to consumer demand. Society consists of two individuals, X and Y. It faces the possibility of a single
13. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 9, at 39-41; Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 461, 470-72 (1985).
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discrete loss, L, with a probability of p. If the loss does not occur, society's total wealth will be W; if it does occur, it will be W-L. There is an
initial specification of entitlements, the distribution of wealth in society,
and who shall bear what portion of the loss should it occur. Have xn and
Yn be X's and Y's respective levels of wealth if the loss does not occur (so
that xn + Yn = W); have x1 and y1 be the corresponding levels of wealth
if the loss does occur (x1 + Y1 = W-L); and have X(x) and Y(y) be X's
and Y's respective utility functions. Their respective expected utilities,
EX and EY, are as follows:

= (1 - p) X(Xn)
(2) EY = (1 - p) Y(yn)

(1) EX

+ p X(x1)
+ p Y(y1)

According to the usual pareto standard, the initial allocation of risk
of loss is efficient if and only if there is no reallocation that, after recompense to the party taking on more risk from the party taking on less,
would make one party better off without making the other party worse
off. This will be the case if and only if the ratio of X's marginal utility
from his level of wealth if the loss does not occur to his marginal utility
from his level of wealth if it does occur equals the corresponding ratio for
Y, that is, X'(xn)IX'(x1) = Y'(yn)/Y'(y1). 14 For convenience of notation,
label X'(Xn), X'(x1), Y'(yn), and Y'(y1) respectively, A, B, C, and D.
To see why this pareto optimality requires that A/B = CID, consider
the following initial allocation of risk of loss and distribution of wealth. If
the loss does not occur, society's wealth, W, is divided between X and Y
such that X's share will be Xn* and Y's will be Yn*. If the loss does occur,
the loss will be borne entirely by Y and so society's wealth, W - L, will be
divided between X and Y such that X's share will be xi* ( = xn*) and Y's
will be Y1* = Yn - L. A*/B* = 1 because xn* = x1*· For the sake of example, let A* and B* = 4. We know that C*ID* < 1 since Yn * > Y1* and
there is diminishing marginal utility from wealth. Again, for the sake of
example, say that C* = 1 and D* = 3, so A* /B* = 1 > CID = t/a.
Now let us see how a reallocation of the risk of loss could make one
party better off without making the other worse off. Set 1x equal to the
amount of the loss, if it occurs, that X will bear (in the initial specification, 1x* = O); set T equal to any recompense that X receives ex ante for
taking any risk (in the initial specification, T* = O); and set N equal to T
- 1x (the net change in x1 and y1 as a result of the reallocation after accounting for the risk X is taking on and the compensation X is receiving
(in the initial allocation N* = 0)). N < 0. Finally, set Iy equal to the
amount of loss borne by Y (so that 1x + Iv = L).
Now suppose that p = .25 and the risk of loss is reallocated so that
N = $1 (which we will assume is a sufficiently small amount that it will
not significantly change X's and Y's marginal utilities). This reallocation
would represent an enhancement of efficiency if the maximum amount,
TY' that Y would be willing to pay X to compensate him for taking on
14. Shavell provides formal proof of this proposition. S. SHAVELL, supra note 6, at 201.
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this risk is greater than the minimum compensation, T x• that X would
insist on in order to be willing to take on the added risk. From equation
(1), we can see that X's expected utility will stay the same if:
(3) (1 - p) il X(Xit) = - p A X(x1)
If no loss occurs, the increase in X's utility as a result of the reallocation, ilX(xn), equals AT (the amount of compensation he receives for taking on the additional risk multiplied by the marginal utility of wealth at
xn *). If the loss does occur, the decrease, ilX(x1) equals BN = B since N
= -1. Solving for the value of Tx, the level of ex ante compensation at
which X would be indifferent whether or not he takes on the risk,

(4) (1 - p)AT = pB
(5) TX = (p/(1 - p))(B/A)
In our example, with A = B = 4 and p = .25, T x
Similarly for Y's expected utility to stay the same,
(6) (1 - p)ilY(y0 )

=

$.33.

= - pA(y1)

AY6rn) equals CT and AY(y1) equals DN = D. Solving for Ty, the value
of T at which Y would be indifferent whether or not to pay compensation,
(7) (1 - p)CTy = pD; Ty = (p/(1 - p))(D/C)
In our example, with C = 1, D = 3, and p = .25, TY = $1.00.
This reallocation of risk of loss to X, as long as it is combined with any ex
ante compensation between $.33 and $1.00, enhances pareto efficiency because it will make one party better off and the other, at a minimum, not
worse off.
This result can be generalized. From equations (5) and (7),
(8) T/Tx = (A/B)/(C/D)
Thus, anytime A/B > CID, Ty > Tx. Therefore, a pareto improvement
can be made by increasing the portion of the risk of loss X bears. In deciding whether to shift the risk of a dollar's worth of net loss, X and Y
are, for any value of T, dealing with the same gamble in terms of the odds
and the dollar amount. Shifting the risk to X means that X takes the
gamble: He receives T but takes on the risk of loss. If it does not occur, Y
takes the gamble: He does not have to pay T but he has the risk of loss.
Because X's marginal utilities of wealth are closer to each other in relative terms, it is less costly in utility terms for X than for Y to take the
gamble. 111 X is the better risk bearer: What Y is willing to pay X for Y to
15. This is true even if one were willing to make interpersonal utility comparisons, and
X put more value in absolute terms on a dollar loss from losing the gamble than Y did. In
the example above, suppose that the sccle used to measure the utility of each was the same.
X's cost of losing an extra dollar if the loss occurs is 4 utils; Y's cost is 3 utils. The calculations illustrate how social welfare is still higher if the risk of a dollar's worth of net loss is
put on X. Suppose that T were $.33. By taking the gamble (as compared to not taking it),
X's utility would go up by 1.33 if he wins and down 4.00 if he loses. Weighting the outcomes
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gain greater certainty is more than worth the cost to X of taking on the
additional risk.
Two important propositions follow that are relevant to the social desirability of imposing strict liability on P. First, some splitting of risk of
loss is always better than none. 16 Second, the more persons among whom
the risk of loss is split, the better. For example, assume that X and Y are
splitting L so that A/B = C/D, a pareto optimal solution given just these
two individuals. But suppose the economy contains a third individual, Z,
who does not share in the risk of loss. The ratio of marginal utilities will
be 1 for Zand less than 1 for X and Y. Following the same logic as to why
splitting between two is better than one individual bearing the risk, the
welfare of all three can be further raised if the risk is instead split among
all of them, this time to the point where the ratios of marginal utilities
from wealth without and with the loss are equal among all three.
ii. A more complex model. Now consider how one can modify this
simplified model, which treats the possible loss as an exogenous event
with a specified magnitude and probability, to reflect the fact that the
possible loss is the result of P's actions, actions that can ultimately be
traced to consumers' decisions to use P's products. Assume that X is P's
sole shareholder and Y is the potential victim. In an efficient world, for
whatever portion of L that Xis to bear, that is, Ix, and whatever portion
the potential victim bears, that is, ly, P's consumers should have to compensate each of them because the risk is a cost of their consumption.17
This cost includes the total expected loss, pL = P1x + Plv, It also includes the amount of compensation that each of them must be paid to be
indifferent to the variability of outcome that he takes on by bearing his
portion of the risk. Applying this to the simple model presented just
above, the decision of whether to shift the risk of another dollar's worth
of net loss to X no longer rests on whether Y is willing to pay X more to
take it on than X would insist on to do it, that is, whether Ty > T x· It
rests instead on whether X or Y would require less compensation from
the consumers to be indifferent to bearing the risk. The analysis, however, is identical: As long as (A/B) > (C/D), X will require less compensation than Y for bearing the risk of the extra dollar's worth of net loss and
probabilistically, X's expected utility is the same whether he takes the gamble or not. By
taking the gamble, Y's utility would go up by .33 if he wins and down by 3.00 if he loses.
Weighting the outcomes probabilistically, Y's expected utility is .5 lower if he takes the
gamble than if he does not. While X is hurt more in absolute terms by losing, he also gains
more from receiving the ex ante compensation than Y suffers from giving it. Thus, the relative difference in marginal utilities determines that X is the better risk bearer.
16. Shavell provides a formal proof of this proposition. S. SHAVELL, supra note 6, at
201-02. Where X bears no risk, A/B = 1 (since x0 = x1), and CID < 1 (since y0 > y1 and
wealth has declining marginal utility). Any splitting of the risk up to and including the
point where A/B = CID will involve a pareto superior move.
17. It is assumed here that it is not practical to transfer the risk of loss to the consumers themselves.
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therefore be the more efficient risk bearer.
Long-run prices in competitive markets permit participating firms to
pass all their costs on to consumers. Thus, if imposing strict liability on P
provides the potential victim with full compensation should the loss occur, that is, Ix = L, prices, at least in the long run, would cover both the
total expected loss, pL, and the amount necessary to make X indifferent
for taking on the additional variability. Consumers would pay the full
cost of their consumption and X and Y would be made whole. 18
iii. Caveats. Some caveats are in order, although probably none
fundamentally undermines the argument that for a significant range of
pairs of activities and possible resulting harms, strict liability will generally enhance the efficiency of risk allocation. The first caveat is that the
parties who are forced to take on a portion of the risk of loss will not
necessarily be compensated for it. In the example above from the simple
model, shifting the risk of a dollar of net loss to X creates the potential
for satisfying the pareto test because that shift, accompanied by ex ante
compensation to X of anything from $.33 to $1.00, represents a combination that will either make both parties better off or make one better off
without making the other worse off. In the more complex model depicting
strict liability, where ideally P's consumers pay the cost of the risk of loss,
it is more efficient for consumers to pay X the $.33 necessary for X to feel
indifferent as to whether he bears the risk of an additional dollar of net
loss than to pay Y the $1.00 necessary for him to feel indifferent as to
whether he bears that risk. If the shift of risk of loss and compensation is
made, X and Y are as well off as before and t~e consumers are better off
because they pay less in compensation.

In both models, however, a failure to provide compensation will cause
the pareto test to fail because the shift of risk will leave someone worse
off. In the simple model, the shift will make Y better off but X worse off
if X does not receive compensation. In the more complex model, depicting strict liability, the pareto test can fail in one of two ways. In this
model, X, through P, looks for compensation from P's consumers in the
form of higher prices rather than looking for it from Y. One possible failure is that X may not receive full compensation for the full cost of bearing the additional risk. P will not, for example, be able to pass on the full
cost of bearing the additional risk of loss if the market is not fully competitive or in long-run equilibrium. To the extent of this shortfall, the
shift makes Y better off and X worse off, and consumers are unaffected.
The other possible failure occurs if X can pass the full cost on. The problem is that prior to the shift of risk of loss, the victim, Y, was not receiving ex ante compensation because there exists no practical mechanism to
18. This arrangement, while solving the efficiency problem of how to make consumers
pay the full costs they impose on others, creates a different problem: There is no splitting of
the loss but rather a placing of all of it on X instead of Y. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.

194

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

force consumers to provide him with it. Thus the shift do~s not save consumers the cost of compensating Y; it only imposes on them the cost of
compensating X. The shift will make Y better off, X will be unaffected,
and the consumers will be worse off.
The standard answer to this problem is the application of the
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion: Where a reallocation would satisfy the
pareto test assuming compensation from the party benefitted to the party
harmed, it should still be undertaken even if compensation is not paid. 19
The rationale for using the Kaldor-Hicks criterion to guide policy is that
X, despite his loss in this instance, is better off living in a world guided
by it than in a world where no reallocation is permitted unless there is
compensation. A rule always requiring compensation would block a large
number of reallocations where the transaction costs of compensation exceed the gains from the reallocation. Whether just randomly or through
the ordinary process of political logrolling, X would have gained from a
majority of these frustrated reallocations. Therefore, X is better off in a
world where compensation is not required. 20
The second caveat is that strict liability will not necessarily result in
the optimal splitting of the risk, which depends on the relative risk aversity of the parties involved. 21 It is always possible that the split puts sufficient risk on parties other than those originally bearing the risk that the
reallocation is worse than no split at all. 22 However, for most pairs of activities and possible resulting harms subject to strict liability, there is no
reason to believe that the distribution of risk aversion in the population is
such that risks will be systematically shifted from less to more risk averse
persons or that even if they were, that they would be shifted to a sufficient extent that the situation would be worse than if the persons potentially harmed by the activity bore all the risk alone. 23
19. For a standard exposition of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, see W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC
THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 378 (2d ed. 1965).
20. See Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 491-97 (1980); Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
21. There are various measures of individual risk aversity, but they all relate to the
shape of an individual's utility from wealth curve. Speaking loosely, the more an individual's
curve curves over the relevant range of wealth, the more risk averse the individual is. If X is
more risk averse in this sense than Y, the split of the risk of loss that will have the ratios of
their marginal utilities equal, A/B = CID, will be one where X takes on less of the risk than
Y. Less difference for X than for Y in wealth outcome between the loss not occurring and
occurring will create the same relative difference in marginal utilities.
22. Suppose that the risk of loss was shifted entirely to X, who is more risk averse
than Y. The result, for example, might be that A/B = IA. Y's ratio, CID, would equal 1. At
the margin, X would be willing to give up more in compensation to move away from this
allocation of risk than Y would have been willing to pay to move away the initial allocation
when Y bore the entire risk of loss.
23. This statement admittedly brings in an interpersonal utility comparison by the
back door. The pareto efficiency test is violated if just one individual takes on, as a result of
strict liability, sufficient risk of loss so that the ex ante compensation he receives is, because
of his high degree of risk aversion, either insufficient to prevent him from being worse off or
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The third caveat is that if strict liability provides victims full compensation, the risk of loss is not split between the individuals potentially
harmed by the activity and the individuals whose wealth positions depend on the fortunes of P-it is shifted entirely to that second group.
One response to this is that strict liability is not likely to provide full
compensation in most cases, particularly when the legal costs of the
harmed party are considered, and so there will in fact usually be a split.
Furthermore, even if victims do receive full compensation, the shift probably represents a gain as judged by Kaldor-Hicks, as long as the group of
persons to whom the risk of loss is shifted is larger than the group that is
actually harmed if the loss occurs.24
B. Sale of Assets Followed by Dissolution
Suppose that P, operating under a system of strict liability, undertakes an activity that may result in harm to others. Before any such harm
becomes apparent, P sells all of its assets to S. S pays cash and assumes
no liabilities. S then dissolves, paying off its creditors and distributing the
remaining cash to its shareholders. Subsequently, it becomes apparent
that V has been harmed by P's activity.
If P still existed, P would be required to compensate V for the harm
suffered. But P does not still exist. Given P's disappearance, P's former
shareholders-the persons who received the liquidating distribution-are
arguably the persons who should compensate V since derivatively they
would have borne the loss if P had continued in existence. In many cases,
however, it will be impossible for V to obtain compensation from the former shareholders.215 That leaves S. But S was not the person that undertook the activity that caused the harm. Absent some special doctrine
so great that it makes the person paying it worse off than if that person had been stuck
bearing the original amount of risk. References to the general distribution of risk aversion in
the population are irrelevant to this question, unless one is prepared to make interpersonal
utility comparisons and to say that gains to most people caused by the split outweigh the
losses to the smaller number of people who will be made worse off. Of course, this is a
problem in applying the pareto criterion to almost any practical issue of policy. The problem is probably best answered just as the pareto test violation due to lack of compensation
is answered. On the whole, any party made worse off by this reallocation of risk is still
better off than he would be if he lived in a world in which no efficiency-motivated reallocations of risk occurred. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
24. This would be the case where the number of P's shareholders exceeds the number
actually hurt if the loss occurs. This second response again brings in interpersonal utility
comparisons by the back door. The comments concerning the fact that a split may not be
optimal are applicable here as well. See supra notes 21 and 23 and accompanying text.
25. Corporate law is not generally hospitable to claims against shareholders arising
after dissolution. See Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 865, 908-09 (1975). Even where there is no substantive
legal problem, a suit against shareholders may be impractical, particularly where the number of shareholders is large and the period of time between dissolution and the appearance
of harm is significant. It will be difficult or impossible to locate all of the shareholders and
prohibitively expensive to engage in the multiple actions necessary to satisfy a judgment
against them.
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making it responsible for the activities of another, S will not be liable to
compensate V.
If no special doctrine does make S responsible, what are the consequences of this possible scenario to the effectiveness of strict liability for
promoting the efficient allocation of resources and risk?
1. Efficient allocation of resources
If the scenario occurs, the firm will have imposed a cost on society for
which it does not pay. However, that fact by itself has no effect on the
resource allocation issue-P's decisions on its method and level of production-because these decisions were made at an earlier time. The critical question is the awareness of P's management at the time that it was
making these production decisions. Given our fundamental assumption
concerning knowledge about possible future states of nature, management
can be expected to contemplate any possibility that exists of a sale of
assets followed by dissolution and the freedom from further liability that
such a scenario entails. To management, the existence of such a possibility reduces the expected cost to shareholders of the activity creating the
potential harm. 28 The activity's expected private cost would thus be lower
than its social cost. Because management seeks to maximize share value,
it would make its production decisions based on expected private costs.
As a result, it will choose a level of output that is inefficiently high, 27 and
its choice of production method may not be the one that involves the
lowest social cost.

2. Efficient allocation of risk

The possibility that the scenario depicted here will occur also represents a partial frustration of strict liability's efficiency enhancing reallocation of the risk of the loss resulting from the activity's harm. If the
scenario occurs, the loss will remain with V. Strict liability's abilities to
reduce risk by pooling and the pain of what remains by sharing are thus
subject to an exception.
26. Absent the possibility of bankruptcy, the shareholders bear derivatively all the
costs that P bears because the value of P is the value of its distributions to shareholders
including the distribution upon liquidation. A dollar more of cost is a dollar less available
for distribution. In the scenario posited here, dissolution permits the firm to escape liability
for the harm the activity caused and so more is available to shareholders than would otherwise be the case if the firm continued in existence at least long enough to pay out on this
liability.
Alan Schwartz has developed a formal model of when, where a firm faces the possibility
of future liability for past acts, it would be in the best interests of shareholders for the firm
to dissolve. ·Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 711-14 (1985).
27. The firm will choose a level of production where the private marginal cost of the
last unit of production equals price, which equals social marginal benefit. Social marginal
cost will exceed private marginal cost and thus exceed social marginal benefit as well.
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C. Imposition of Liability on the Successor

In certain circumstances, courts have imposed liability on successor
corporations like S that, though not themselves having engaged in any
activity causing harm, purchased the assets of a corporation like P that
dissolved prior to the appearance of a harm for which the dissolved corporation would otherwise have been strictly liable.28 The simple economic
analysis of the problem suggests that successor liability will restore the
effectiveness of strict liability to the extent it was undermined by the possibility of the sale of assets/dissolution scenario. However, note that the
relationship between liability and the desired behavior by P's management is more attenuated and therefore the assumptions concerning managerial motivation and distribution of information are more critical.
1. Efficient allocation of resources

Given my fundamental assumption concerning uniform knowledge
about the probability of future states of nature, the existence of a successor liability rule can be expected to change management's view of the
future consequences of certain decisions. Part of what P's management
decides in its choices of level of output and method of production is the
extent to which it will engage in an activity potentially harmful to others.
At the time it makes this decision, management knows that, with or without a rule imposing successor liability, there is a possibility the sale of
assets/dissolution scenario will occur and that if it does P will not have to
pay damages for harm that appears after dissolution. However, with a
rule imposing successor liability, management also knows when it makes
its decision that undertaking the activity will negatively affect the price it
will receive for its assets in this scenario. The more P engages in the activity, the greater any buyer's potential liability will be. Since P's management and any buyer will, if the scenario occurs, possess the same
information and share the same assessment of the probability of such liability, the buyer will discount what it is willing to offer by an amount just
equal to the amount P's management expects at the time of the sale to
save as a result of being relieved from possible liability. Thus, a rule imposing successor liability works as a complete antidote to the way the sale
of assets/dissolution scenario undermines strict liability's effectiveness in
promoting efficient allocation of resources. With a successor liability rule,
management faces the same expected reduction in what is available to its
shareholders if it decides to engage in the potential harmful activity
whether or not it subsequently sells its assets and dissolves. Thus, the
possibility of the sale of assets/dissolution scenario does not affect the
harmful activity's expected cost to shareholders, and private cost will
again equal social cost.
28. See generally Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem
of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559 (1984); Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906 (1983).
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2. Efficient allocation of risk

Successor liability also corrects the partial frustration of strict liability's efficiency enhancing reallocation of the risk of loss that the possible
sale of assets/dissolution scenario could otherwise cause. Looking at the
problem first from the potential victims' point of view, successor liability
fills in a chink in their protection: It will relieve them of risk of loss
whether or not the sale of assets/dissolution scenario occurs.
It is slightly more complex to look at the problem from the points of
view of P and S, the parties taking on the risk. P does not take on the
risk of loss under any wider range of circumstances with successor liability than without it: P will not in any event bear the risk of loss if the sale
of assets/dissolution scenario occurs.29 However, P will receive less on account of successor liability at the time it sells its assets because riskiness
in outcome will cause the shareholders of S disutility. To compensate for
this disutility, S will further discount what it offers P for the assets beyond the expected liability payout.
The remaining question is whether the story of the likely efficiency of
reallocating risk from potential victims to P can still be told if the risk is
reallocated instead to a buyer such as S.3 ° Certainly, allocating the risk to
S will be just as effective as allocating it to P in terms of pooling. Pooling
just requires concentrating all the risks in one place. 31 As for risk sharing,
two propositions argued in favor of imposing strict liability on P: Some
splitting of risk is better than none, and it is better to split a risk among
more persons than fewer. There is no reason to think that successor corporations are going to be consistently different from predecessors in any
way that would make these propositions less powerful arguments for imposing liability as well on successors as a class.
II. A

BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

Now drop the first fundamental assumption that every participant in
the economy has the same information and makes the same probability
assessments. Instead, more realistically, recognize that, where P is a publicly held corporation, individuals within P have certain bits of informa29. This statement is a slight oversimplification. P does bear the risk that the
probability of liability will appear higher at the time of sale of the assets than at the time
that the potentially harmful activity is undertaken. If that happens, the sales price will be
discounted to account for S's potential liability by more than P expected at the time the
activity was undertaken.
30. This is an issue even though the buyer is compensated through a lower price for
taking on the risk. If S were sufficiently different than P, it might be more efficient to allo·
cate the risk to P than to the potential victims and more efficient to allocate it to the potential victims than to S. Yet, the assets may be worth substantially more under S's
management than under P's. In that case, the price Sis willing to offer, even after discount
for risk that would be more efficiently borne by P or the potential victims, may be great
enough to make P want to sell.
31. Of course, there might be a difference in the portion of each company's shares held
by shareholders with highly diversified portfolios. Such portfolios further reduce risk
through their own pooling.
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tion not possessed by persons outside of P. Also, while different persons
within P have different bits of information, P as an organization can
make more accurate probability assessments than any outsider concerning many events that will affect P's fortunes. The purpose of this Part is
to see how this alteration changes our pictures of strict liability's effectiveness in promoting efficient allocations of resources and risk, the
problems the sale of assets/dissolution scenario causes, and successor liability's capacity to cure the problems. These questions all relate to how
we expect firms to respond to particular legal regimes. Thus, the logical
starting point is a discussion of how the change of assumptions affects the
general theory of firm behavior.

A. A Behavioral Model of the Firm
Dropping the first fundamental assumption in turn calls into question the second fundamental assumption, that P's management always
acts to maximize share value. When shareholders have all the same information as management, shareholders will know when managers do not act ·
to maximize share value and will promptly vote to replace them. When
shareholders do not possess as much information, they will often not
know that alternative decisions would be better and so they cannot perform this role with full effectiveness. Thus, at least at the first level of
analysis, when a decision different from the one that serves shareholders'
best interests serves management's best interests, management often has
the freedom to choose the latter.32 While the market for corporate control33 and the various forces that adherents of the "agency" or "contrac32. This is Berle and Means' basic observation that a large portion of our economy's
production now comes from corporations in which share ownership is separated from managerial control and that management in those corporations will have a certain amount of
discretion. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 1-11,
220-32 (1932).
33. The idea that managerial freedom can be effectively constrained by the market for
corporate control originates with Henry Manne. See generally Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110 (1965). His story, updated to reflect
modern developments in financial economic theory, goes something like this. P's share price,
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, will reflect all information possessed by any
outsider and will represent an unbiased estimate of the future stream of dividends and other
distributions accruing to the shareholders discounted to present value (the share's "actual
value"). If management makes decisions that deviate from the best interests of shareholders, this will on average result in P's shares selling at a discount below the price at which the
share would sell if management did not deviate. If just one outsider realizes that P could be
run in a way that increases share value, he will purchase sufficient shares of P to gain control, correct the deviation and, because of the resulting increase in the actual value of the
shares, reap a profit. The threat of such hostile takeover will likely keep P's management
from deviating in the first place.
However, the ability of the hostile takeover threat to constrain management deviation
is inherently limited by the risk that it introduces to the portfolio of any potential acquiror.
This limitation is more easily seen in the case of a very wealthy individual acquiror. Beyond
a certain point, which for any publicly traded target of significant size is well below what is
needed to acquire control, each share of the target added to the acquiror's investment portfolio adds increasingly to the portfolio's risk because the portfolio becomes less diversified.
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tual" theory of the corporation rely on34 help constrain this freedom, they
Thus, a deviation below a certain size will not trigger a takeover. The acquiror must view
the target as so sufficiently mismanaged that the correction of the problem will yield enough
gain in value to compensate for the added risk. The same principles largely apply where the
acquiror is a corporation. For a more detailed analysis of the problem considering both the
individual and corporate acquiror, see M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRiAL PERFORMANCE IN A
DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY 62-63, 84-91 (1987) [hereinafter M. Fox,
FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE].
This limitation in the ability of the hostile takeover to constrain management is present
even where outsiders are as well informed as insiders. It is accentuated if outsiders know
less than insiders. Share price, though still unbiased, is a less accurate assessment of the
share's actual value under incumbent management, thereby adding tp the share's unsystematic risk. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Dili·
gence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1010-14 (1984). Similarly, the acquiror's
assessment of how mismanaged the target really is, though unbiased, will also be less accurate. Both results of outsider ignorance amplify the added risk to the acquiror's portfolio
from taking on the undiversifying amount of shares that control requires. Id. at 1013-14.
34. One force relates to a firm's articles of incorporation. Jensen and Meckling argue
that when an entrepreneur takes a firm public, it is to his interest, in order to get the best
price for his shares, to include provisions within the articles of incorporation (the "contract"
between the corporation and its shareholders) that, to the extent cost effective, constrain
management's ability to make decisions that deviate from those that maximize share value.
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Owner·
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 312-19 (1976). A second force relates to the managerial
labor market: Managers will be mindful that the difference between a decision today that
maximizes share value from one that does not, even when not immediately apparent, will
over time become increasingly apparent and thereby influence the decisionmaker's future
wages. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. EcoN. 288
(1980). A third force is the ratification and monitoring of the operative decisions of individual managers by other managers (who are concerned about the influence of future share
prices on their future wages) and the board of directors. See id. at 292-93; Fama & Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. LAW & EcoN. 301, 310-11 (1983). A fourth force
is the pressure of competition: While a firm with greater than minimum costs can survive
for a while, the lowest cost producers will be more profitable and, because of those profits,
expand relative to the higher cost producers. Product price will eventually reflect the costs
of the lowest cost producers. This price would squeeze out higher cost producers because
they would not be able to earn a competitive rate of return on invested capital. See Alchian,
Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. PoL. EcoN. 211, 213-18 (1950); Fama &
Jensen, supra, at 301; Fama, supra, at 289.
Agency or contractual theory posits the existence of certain "agency costs," which are
the sum of "monitoring costs," "bonding costs" and "residual loss." Monitoring costs and
bonding costs are the costs incurred by management and shareholders to encourage management pursuit of share value maximization. Residual loss is the cost to shareholders of the
remaining deviation between the decisions that would maximize share value and the ones
that management actually makes given whatever is expended on monitoring and bonding.
Agency costs are the inevitable result of the advantages from specialization with one group
(shareholders) bearing risk and another (management) making decisions. Pareto optimality
does not require that residual loss be eliminated but just that it be reduced by expenditures
on bonding and monitoring to the point where further expenditures would not be cost effective. Jensen & Meckling, supra, at 308, 327-28.
It is important to realize that the theory's concept of "residual loss" is a way of formally
incorporating the insight of Berle and Means concerning the management discretion arising
from separation and control into the framework of neo-classical economics. Adherents of
agency theory see the four forces cited above as working to reduce agency costs to the minimum possible and thus obviating the need for legally imposed constraints on management.
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do not eliminate it.
Within its range of discretion, management will make the decision
that favors itself any time the management team's and shareholders' interests diverge. But even when shareholder and management interests coincide, the firm may not act to maximize share value. This is because
dropping the assumption of equal information goes beyond the resulting
incapacity of shareholders to constrain management. It undercuts as well
the idea of treating management as the basic unit of analysis. Given that
different persons within the firm have different information, treating
management as an organization that has within it particular patterns of
internal information flow and decision delegation better explains firm
behavior. 35

B. Strict Liability
1. Allocation of resources
How, if at all, does this change in assumption change our expectations concerning P's decisions under a strict liability regime? What will
be its effect on the decisions of production method and level where the
process may involve an activity with the potential for causing future harm
to others?
Persons within the firm are more likely to have information relevant
to calculating the possibility of future liability than persons outside the
firm. Thus, at least in the short run, management has a certain amount of
discretion: Decisions that ignore that possibility will neither cause shareHowever, they do not see these forces as necessarily eliminating residual loss. In fact, the
theory seems in part born out of a realization that the takeover threat by itself has serious
shortcomings as a means of constraining management. For example, one of the theory's primary architects, Eugene Fama, finds that "Manne's approach . . . offers little comfort [to
those concerned with the incentive problem caused by the separation of share ownership
from control]." Fama, supra, at 295. Furthermore, if I am correct in the position I have
taken elsewhere, that these other four forces will not be as effective in minimizing agency
costs as adherents of the theory claim, then the remaining managerial discretion would be
that much greater. See M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE, supra note 33, at
140-50; Fox, The Role of the Market Model in Corporate Law Analysis: A Comment on
Weiss and White, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1015, 1041-44 (1988).
35. This distinction underlies the difference between managerial and behavioral theories of the firm. Managerial theories of the firm explore what kinds of decisions a firm would
make if, subject to some minimum profit constraint, management maximized some interest
of management as a team, such as sales or firm growth, rather than share value. See, e.g., W.
BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE, AND GROWTH (1959); Marris, A Model of "Managerial"
Enterprise, 77 Q. J. EcoN. 185 (1963). The behavioral theory of the firm is based on empirical observation of firm behavior in the presence of a variety of environmental stimuli. Firms
are found to react only to a select subset of stimuli, displaying relatively stable decision
rules as long as the results satisfy certain performance aspirations. Only failure to meet
performance aspirations leads to a review of what stimuli to note and how to react to them.
This pattern describes not only the firm as a whole but subgroups within it and even individuals. See, e.g., Simon, Theories of Decision-making in Economics and Behavior Science,
49 AM. ECON. REV. 253 (1959); J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (1958); R. CYERT & J.
MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963).
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holders to vote management out of office nor adversely affect share price.
Yet, decisions concerning method and level of production that do not account for the possibility of future liability will, on average, negatively affect the firm's long run aggregate "managerial cash flow," that is, the
firm's earnings prior to deduction for depreciation and for managerial
compensation and expenses. This managerial cash flow is both the source
of long-run managerial utility3 6 and the determinant of long-term share
price. 37
In the long run, therefore, management is better off and less vulnerable to takeover if it does not utilize its discretion to boost short-term
earnings by making choices of method and level of production that do not
account for the possibility of future liability. Whether it does so depends,
among other factors, on its time horizon. There is no question that certain circumstances-the threat of immediate takeover or bankruptcy-will lead management to have a short time horizon. In general,
however, management as a team probably has a much greater ability to
operate as a self-perpetuating institution with long-term goals than people just looking at the average chief executive's remaining tenure often
suppose.38
However, the existence of managerial goals that call for the firm to
react to one particular feature of its external environment-the possibility of future liability-in the same fashion as would a corporation maximizing share value does not guarantee that the firm will in fact react this
way. For a number of reasons, management's acquisition and processing
of information concerning possible future liability is likely to take a pattern that minimizes the problem and leads the firm irrationally to trade
too much chance of future liability for a boost in current earnings.
First consider the simplest situation, the one where very top management makes the production method and output decisions. The sequence
of the decision process discourages full consideration of the probability of
future liability. The first ·step is a tentative decision based solely on input
cost data, engineering possibilities, and market data. Then someone reviews the decision for potential liability. 39 The liability reviewer is thus
cast as a potential "naysayer," a person who undermines the optimism
36. This cash flow provides whatever compensation and perquisites management receives above what is competitively necessary. It also provides the internal funds for investment and as such is an important determinant of firm size and rate of growth, additional
sources of managerial utility. See M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE, supra
note 33, at 122-27, 138-40.
37. Share price in the long run should equal share value, which is determined by the
flow of dividends and other distributions to shareholders.
38. See generally M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE, supra note 33, at
128-29.
39. An empirical study of product safety programs in four large firms found that review procedures were not incorporated sufficiently early in the design process. The study,
sponsored by the National Science Foundation and conducted by Alvin Weinstein and colleagues, is summarized in G. EADS & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS: CORPORATE
RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 79-85 (1983),
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that helps hold the decision-making group together and who must fight
those who have already made up their minds that the tentative decision is
a good idea. 40
This problem is compounded if the production method and output
decisions are made at a lower level, as is typically the case with larger
firms. Often the measure of the decisionmaker's performance is meeting
some task goal, not enhancing firm profits, which is too difficult to relate
to a particular decision.41 Even when the decisionmakers are compensated
on the basis of their unit's profitability, the measure is short-term profit.
In either case, therefore, one of top management's tasks is to monitor
decisions that may raise too much risk of future liability. But much of the
information necessary for this task is initially in the hands of the operating level decisionmakers, who have an interest in suppressing it. 42
Whatever information does make it into the pipeline toward the top is
subject to all the typical hazards of bad news. 43
When liability does occur, often years after the decision that gave
rise to it, the experience does little to deter operating level decisionmakers from ignoring liability risks in the future. A firm that has just
finished trying to prove to the outside world that it was not responsible
for damage has a hard time suddenly turning inward on its own employees in an attempt to determine which of them in fact were responsible.
Even when top management is willing to try, finding those responsible is
difficult because corporate memory fades fast, given personnel mobility
and regular record destruction. In those instances where the "culprits"
are found, fashioning a sanction is difficult. This is particularly true in a
strict liability system, because a certain amount of liability-creating activity may be cost-effective and thus in the firm's and management's
interest.
The conclusion from all of this is that imposing strict liability on P
may not result in P fully accounting for the social costs of its decisions.
When there is a threat of imminent bankruptcy or takeover, management's time horizon may be so short that the possibility of liability further in the future is largely irrelevant. In most other situations, although
management's time horizon may not be the problem, defects in acquiring
and processing information cause the firm to act as though the risks of
future liability are lower than they are. The result in either case is that
the firm will choose a method of production that, given its risk of harm to
40. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 42-43 (1975); I. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 174-75 (2d ed.
rev. 1983). See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
41. C. STONE, supra note 40, at 44-45.
42. Id. at 44.
43. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate
Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1132-39 (1977). In part
based on their in-depth interviews of corporate officials, Eads and Reuter concluded that at
least in the new product design area there are safety problems that are not detected and
corrected before the product is presented to management for the go ahead decision, yet the
structure that is set up to insulate management from minor details prevents them from
learning about the problems. G. EADS & P. REUTER, supra note 39, at 60.
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others, is inefficient, or, if the choice of that method is correct, the firm
will produce at an inefficiently high level of output.
2. Efficient allocation of risk

At the first level of analysis, nothing that flows from the changed
assumption concerning information distribution makes P any less likely
to be the most efficient risk bearer. Putting the risk on P will create the
same amount of risk-reducing pooling and result in the same extent of
risk sharing among the same persons with the same utility functions.
However, P's unknowingly taking on risk when it makes its decisions has
two consequences of note.
First, assuming that P's competitors are similarly unaware of the liability risk due to the same inherent organizational limitations, the market
price will not reflect either the potentially harmful activity's expected
damages or the compensation necessary to make the individuals who ultimately bear the additional outcome variability (those whose wealth depends on P's fortunes) indifferent between taking on the risk and not.
Thus, if the harm materializes, P, and derivatively those whose wealth
depends on P, will have to pay out damages to victims because of a risk
their agents (P's management) unknowingly took on. This situation could
arguably be better characterized as an ex post reallocation of losses,
which welfare economics cannot show to enhance efficiency, rather than a
reallocation of risk, which can be shown to enhance efficiency} 4
Second, everything else being equal, allocating the risk to P represents a societal presumption that, after the pooling and sharing, those
whose wealth depends on firms such as P will find bearing the remaining
risk less costly than potential victims find bearing the bare risk of harm.4G
This presumption might be incorrect in any particular case. If it is sufficiently incorrect in the example of P and P is aware of the risk it takes on
if it undertakes the dangerous activity, P will avoid the activity. This is a
suboptimal result since it prevents P from undertaking an activity that,
with the correct risk allocation, it would have found profitable. But it
forms some kind of a check on sufficiently erroneous societal assessments
of which group will bear the risk with less cost. When P takes on some or
44. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. The problem with treating this scenario as a reallocation of risk at the time the production decisions were made relates to what
probability assessment to use. Risk must be defined in terms of. probability assessments,
which are always conditional upon a given information set. Information may have been
available at the time of the production decision that would have permitted one to conclude
that the activity would create a certain risk of harm, but there may have been no one who
gathered that information and made the assessment.
45. Of course, everything else may not be equal. Society might allocate the risk of loss
to P for efficient allocation of resources reasons even though it knows that those whose
wealth depends on P's fortunes are the inferior risk bearers. If private insurance is available
to P in a competitive market, the apparent efficiency dilemma can be solved. If insurance is
not available, it would be better for the government, instead of imposing liability on P, to
become the insurer by taxing P for the expected damage and providing compensation to any
victims. However, society may fail to pursue this option.
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all of the liability risk unknowingly, this check will not operate.
C. Sale of Assets Followed by Dissolution
1. No imposition of liability on a successor

Consider again the possible sale of assets/dissolution scenario. However, this time drop the assumption that every participant in the economy has the same information. What effect does dropping that
assumption have on our assessment of the impact of the possibility of this
scenario on the effectiveness of strict liability for promoting the efficient
allocation of resources and risk if there is no expectation that liability will
be imposed on S?
With the assumption dropped, two reasons suggest that the possibility of the sale of assets/dissolution scenario will do less to undermine
strict liability's effectiveness. First, as I have just discussed, imposing
strict liability is generally not as effective at promoting efficient allocation
of resources and risk as appeared to be the case using the simple economic analysis of the problem. To some extent, P will act as though there
is no risk of liability when there is. To that extent, the existence of a
contingency-the sale of assets/dissolution scenario-under which the
firm will be free from liability will not influence the firm's behavior when
it makes production decisions. Nor will the contingency's existence alter
the sense that, with a risk of loss undertaken unknowingly, imposing liability is not as easy to justify as an efficient reallocation of risk.
Second, the same organizational features that limit the firm's awareness of the liability risk are even more likely to limit its awareness that
the sale of assets/dissolution scenario might occur and relieve it of liability."6 Even when in the shareholders' best interests, dissolution of the
firm is an extremely unattractive prospect for incumbent managers." 7 Dissolution involves the whole team losing their jobs, something that managers are loath to permit because of the difficulty in obtaining
46. Professor Mark Roe has considered a closely related issue. He has examined the
likelihood that management, at a time when crisis looms much closer and with greater certainty than at the time of the initial decisions as to method and level of production, will
strategically choose the sale of assets/dissolution scenario. He concludes that they often will
not choose that scenario even when to do so would be in shareholders' best interests, in part
because this is a time when the mechanisms that align managerial and shareholders interests will be most ineffective. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV.
1, 7-30 (1986). As reflected in the text below, many of the factors that Roe identifies as
relevant to the issue he examines are relevant as well to the issue discussed here, which is
managerial awareness, at the time when the production decisions are being made, of the
possibility of being freed from liability by the sale of assets/dissolution scenario.
47. At the time that crisis looms, sale of assets and dissolution may be the best outcome for shareholders because it offers the opportunity of avoiding liability. From management's point of view, it is forced to choose between the certainty of losing its jobs from
dissolution versus some chance that it will survive the liability suit and will be able to retain
its jobs indefinitely if the firm does not dissolve. Even bankruptcy offers a better opportunity for job retention than the sale of assets/dissolution scenario. See id. at 7-14.
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reemployment with comparable status, power, and income.'8 Dissolution
also offends managers' sense of professionalism, since managers view their
job to be running an ongoing organization.
Therefore, management is not likely to give prominence to information concerning the possibility that a sale of assets/dissolution scenario
would permit evasion of potential liability when deciding on the method
and level of production. Management will not suddenly abandon any caution that potential liability introduces in the making of these decisions
because of the reassurance that the firm, after all, might dissovle.

2. Imposition of liability on the successor
Management, as I have just explained, may not fully account both for
the possibility of its acts generating liability and for the possibility of the
sale of assets/dissolution scenario. Whether or not there is a rule imposing liability on successor corporations in the states of nature represented
by these two kinds of unaccounted for situations will have absolutely no
influence on the firm's method and level of production decisions.4 9
III. THE CosT OF SuccEssoR LIABILITY
When P sells its assets to S, productive capacity is transferred from
the hands of one management group to another. By engaging in the cash
sale, S shows thut it prefers the assets over the cash while P prefers the
cash over the assets. The buyer thus believes that the assets are worth
more in its hands than the seller believes the assets are worth in its. Absent special circumstances, such as particular information deficiencies or
third pB.!'ty effects, these revealed beliefs support a strong presumption
48. As a general matter, it is difficult for senior managers to obtain comparable employment elsewhere. They are compensated in part for their ability to get things done
within a corporation for which they have worked for a long time, an asset of no value to
another firm. Also, their salaries may exceed their productive contribution to the firm because the firm's salary structure may undercompensate managers in their early years and
overcompensate them in their more senior years as part of an effort to retain managers in
which the firm has invested through on-the-job training. For a review of the relevant literature on this subject, see M. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE, supra note 33, at
145-46.
49. These two factors move P's behavior in opposite directions. Thus, P's production
decisions would be further from the optimal ones if P took full account of the possibility of
the sale of assets/dissolution scenario and the resulting shedding of liability.
However, the issue here is not the aggregate effect of these two factors on P's production decisions, but rather how they influence the impact of the sale of assets/dissolution
scenario. It is this second issue that is relevant to the policy question of whether the possibility of the scenario has a sufficiently grave impact to justify the costs (which are explored
below) of a rule imposing liability on successors. In terms of this second issue, the two factors work in the same direction because each works to make the existence of successor liability irrelevant. To see this, consider the extremes of each factor. One extreme is that
management would be totally unaware of any possibility of liability arising from the activity. The other extreme is that management would be totally unaware of any possibility of
the sale of assets/dissolution scenario. Clearly, in each case, whether there is a successor
liability rule would have no effect on management's production decisions.
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that the transfer is efficiency enhancing, that is, that S's management can
use the assets more productively than P's could.
A transfer of an ongoing business such as P's is typically more complex than a simple exchange of cash for some physical items. One term of
the transaction concerns which party should be responsible for the liabilities that arise after the transfer but are the result of P's actions prior to
the transfer. As noted earlier, Swill pay less in cash for the assets if the
term requires it to take over these liabilities.
The central issue of this article is whether the law should dictate this
term and require the buyer to be responsible for these liabilities, or
whether the term should be left to the parties to negotiate. Parts I and II
explored, under differing assumptions concerning information distribution, the benefit of the first approach. Part ill now explores its costs: its
negative effect on the market-based process for moving assets into the
most productive hands. This will be done by comparing the expected behavior of P and S as potential parties to a transfer of assets transaction,
first when they are free to negotiate the assumption of liabilities and then
when the term is mandated.
A. Free Negotiation

What kind of deal would P and S negotiate on their own? To isolate
the salient factors, I will first consider this question under the artificial
assumption that P cannot dissolve (so that P cannot evade liability if it
agrees to retain it). Then I will drop that assumption.

1. P's dissolution impossible
Each party will have a view as to its cost of bearing the risk of future
liability for P's past activities. The party that views bearing the risk as
less costly will be the one that will agree to take it on, because it will
insist on less alteration of the purchase price for doing so than the other
party will. On average, the seller will be the party that views bearing the
risk as less costly and therefore will be the one to take it on more often.
One reason one party may view the risk as less costly than the other
does concerns differences in the disutility of bearing risk generally. Thus,
both parties might have the identical view of the probability distribution
that generates a risk, but one party might view bearing the risk as less
costly than the other party would. This difference would be caused by
such factors as the number of individuals whose wealth depends on the
fortunes of the party and the division of this interest among them, the
degree to which their respective investment portfolios are diversified, and
the relative risk aversity of their respective utility functions. As discussed
earlier, however, there is no reason to think that there would be a systematic difference between buyers and sellers in these regards.
The other possible cause for one party viewing a risk as less costly to
bear relates to differences in the parties' views on the probability distribution that generates the risk. Simplifying somewhat, their views can differ in two important ways. One party may view the expected value of the
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possible loss from liability (the average of all the possible outcomes
weighted in accordance with the party's assessment of the probability of
the outcome) differently from the other. Or, one party may assess the
variance of the possible loss (the likely difference between the expected
value and the actual outcome) differently from the other.
If one party views the expected value of the loss as less than the
other, that party will obviously take on the risk of loss, everything else
being equal (that is, variance assessments and all the factors referred to
above relating to the cost of bearing risks generally). Again, however, sellers such as P are not likely to be systematically more or less optimistic
than buyers such as S. P almost certainly has much more information
than S and indeed may selectively share with S only that information
that tends to minimize the chances of loss. However, S is aware of these
information deficiencies and can make appropriate adjustments based,
among other things, on what it knows about the integrity of P's management and about the typical amount of puffing that sellers employ. Thus
S's and P's estimates of the expected value, though usually different since
they are based on different information sets, should each be unbiased. 110
In other words, each one is a best guess that is no more likely to be too
low than too high.
Similarly, if one party views the variance of the loss as less than the
other, that party will also take on the risk of loss, everything else being
equal. That is because the party that views the variance as less will view
the gamble it is taking on as involving less risk, that is, less utility costing
variability in outcome. 111 Here, sellers such as P are systematically more
likely to make lower variance estimates than buyers such as S. S believes
that its estimate of expected return is unbiased but it also will have a
sense of its accuracy. Because Sis not as well informed as P, the expected
value of its subjective probability distribution-S's best guess of the
loss-is likely to be less accurate, that is, likely to be further one way or
the other from the actual outcome.
Putting the analyses of these two factors together, there is no reason
to think that the seller's expected value will be systematically smaller
than the buyer's, but there is reason to think that the seller's variance
will be smaller than the buyer's. Thus, we would expect that more often
than not P would take on the risk of liability as part of the deal to sell its
50. P's management's assessment of expected liability is not subject to the same
downward bias here as it was at the time of the production decisions that gave rise to the
possible liability. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. Such an assessment is just
one of many factors being considered by management in making the production decision.
The bias comes in large part from the other factors, which pull the decision in the opposite
direction and affect how the group processes information. Here, the decision is simply
whether or not, for a given price, to retain liability. The only relevant factor is this
assessment.
51. This assumes, realistically, that at least some persons whose wealth depends on
the fortunes of the party concerned (for example, management and less than fully diversified shareholders) cannot completely diversify away this risk. See supra notes 32-35 and
accompanying text.
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assets to S. 112

2. P's Dissolution Possible
If instead, P's dissolution is possible, S's view as to the cost of being
the one to bear the risk of future liability for P's past activities will remain unchanged. In P's view, however, the cost will be lowered or even
eliminated, because with dissolution neither P nor in all likelihood its
shareholders will have to pay the liability. Introducing the possibility of
P's dissolution has two effects on the conclusions reached above. First, for
transactions that would have occurred anyway, the dissolution possibility
simply increases the likelihood that P rather than S will take on the liability. Second, a certain number of transactions will take place that otherwise would not have, because they are not justified in terms of the buyer
thinking it can make more productive use of the assets than the seller
thinks it can. For these cases, the only reason the assets are more valuable in the buyer's than in the seller's hands is that they are shed of liability in the buyer's hands.

B. Liability Mandated
How will potential parties to a transfer of assets transaction behave
where, if the deal is made, S's assumption of the liabilities is legally mandated? Obviously the issue of who has liability would be settled. The benefits of a rule imposing liability in terms of P's production decisions at
the time it contemplates undertaking the potentially harmful activity and
in terms of risk allocation have already been discussed. The only remaining issue is what mandating this term will do to the market for control of
corporate assets: which beneficial transfers of assets do not occur that
otherwise would have, and which harmful transfers do not occur that otherwise would have.

1. Beneficial transactions that do not occur that otherwise would
have
Consider all of the transfers of assets that would occur if P took on
the risk of loss under the assumptions that the parties were free to negotiate the terms and that P could not dissolve. Mandating that the buyer
take on the risk of loss instead will cause some of these transactions not
to occur. The party that views taking on the risk as more costly will be
required to take it on. This requirement in essence introduces a transaction cost.113 The only transactions that will still go through are those
52. Applied to the real world, this is really a statement of conditions at the margin.
Other factors such as taxes and accounting may cause the parties to structure the transaction in the form of a merger, in which case S, by operation of corporate law, automatically
becomes responsible for P's liabilities.
53. By thorough investigation, the buyer could reduce or perhaps even eliminate the
difference in knowledge between the parties. If the difference in knowledge is what initially
made the buyer the more costly risk bearer, this cost differential would be reduced or elimi-
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where the increase in productive value resulting from transferring the assets to the buyer is sufficiently large to make up for the difference between the parties in the cost of bearing the risk. The transactions that are
lost are all presumptively efficiency enhancing. Their loss thus represents
a social cost of mandating the liability term.

2. Harmful transactions that do not occur that otherwise would
have
Now consider all of the transfers of assets that would not have occurred under the assumptions that the parties are free to negotiate the
term and that P cannot dissolve, but do occur under the assumptions that
they are free to negotiate and P can dissolve. These transfers will not
occur if there is successor liability, just as they will not occur if P cannot
dissolve. They are not presumptively efficiency enhancing; if they were,
they would have occurred without the possibility of P dissolving. That
the -possibility of P's dissolution is necessary for them to occur strongly
suggests the opposite: The assets will move to less productive hands.

3. The net cost of mandating liability
Mandating liability, as just discussed, results in the elimination of
two classes of transactions. Elimination of the first class-transactions
that would have occurred with free negotiation even if the seller could not
dissolve-involves a loss of value because the assets would have moved to
more productive hands. Elimination of the second class-transactions
that would have occurred with free negotiation but only if the seller can
dissolve-involves a gain in value because the assets would have moved to
less productive hands. The net cost of mandating liability is the aggregate
loss less the aggregate gain. There is obviously no necessity that the losses
from the first group exceed the gains from the second. A negative "net
cost" would mean that mandating liability yields transactional gains, in
addition to the benefits of successor liability discussed in Parts I and II.
At first glance, whether the net cost is positive or negative appears to
be an empirical question that cannot be resolved without access to data
that may be difficult or impossible to obtain. However, further examination provides good reasons to believe that the net cost is positive. First, as
discussed earlier, a sale of assets solely to benefit shareholders by shedding liabilities is something that management is loath to do, and the
forces that normally help align shareholder and management interests do
little to impel that result. 64 Second, the ordinary exceptions to the general
corporate law rule of no successor liability form a relatively effective
screen for catching transactions motivated by a desire to shed liabilities
while letting through transactions motivated by other reasons. GD
nated. However, all that would be involved would be the substitution of one transaction
cost-the need for investigation-for another.
54. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
55. Under traditional corporate law doctrines, successor corporations are not liable for
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GENERAL APPROACH TO SUCCESSOR LIABILITY AND THE CASE OF

CERCLA
For any given activity and associated harm subject to a strict liability
regime, how should we decide whether that liability should attach to the
sucessor in a sale of assets/dissolution scenario? The preceding discussion
has provided a framework for answering this question. In this concluding
Part, I will pull together the threads of this discussion and apply it to the
question of successor liability under CERCLA.
A.

A General Approach

Under the simple economic analysis of the problem when everyone
possesses the same information, the case for imposing liability on a successor such as S is just as compelling as imposing it on an original producer such as P. P's management, when it makes its production decisions,
fully comprehends the chance that its activity will result in harm and
hence liability. The prospect of this liability will equate the firm's private
and social costs of production and lead the firm to make efficient production decisions. Management also fully comprehends the chances that a
sale of assets/dissolution scenario will occur with, absent a rule imposing
successor liability, its resulting freedom from liability. A rule imposing
successor liability cures the problem because, with both parties possessing
the same information, the resulting reduction in the expected purchase
price of the assets equals the expected liability payout if the assets were
not sold. S can pool and, on average, share risks just as effectively as P.
The rule does not adversely affect the market for control of corporate
assets because, with both parties equally informed and thus sharing the
same mean and variance estimates of the risk of liability, there is no reason to think that buyers will systematically find it more costly than sellers to bear the risk.t16 Thus, from a policy point of view, there is no more
reason to leave S free from liability than P. A societal determination that
it makes sense for P to be strictly liable implies that it makes equal sense
for S to be liable as well.
the obligations of predecessors absent one of four circumstances. The exceptions are: (1) the
transaction involved an express or implied assumption of liabilities; (2) the transaction was
a de facto merger or consolidation; (3) the successor corporation is a mere continuation of
the predecessor; or (4) the transaction was fraudulent, not made in good faith, or made
without adequate consideration. See 15 w. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 7122 (rev. perm. ed. 1983). Transactions that are motivated by economic
efficiency reasons should not be caught by the screen since they require a change in control,
something incompatible with exceptions two and three. On the other hand, where the crisis
is imminent, transactions motivated by the desire to shed liabilities stand a good chance of
being caught by exception (4), since lack of adequate consideration would be assessed from
the perspective of unsatisfied potential tort creditors.
56. Even though there should be no systematic difference between buyers and sellers
in the disutility of bearing risk generally, there may be a difference with any particular pair
of potential buyer and seller. Mandating that the buyer take on the risk in these cases still
creates some kind of transaction cost, but it is a smaller one than when the buyer is less
informed than the seller.
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The situation changes when the assumption of equal information is
dropped. Management will fail to account fully for both the possiblity of
its acts generating liability and the possibility of the sale of assets/dissolution scenario. Both failures reduce the negative impact of the scenario
on strict liability's effectiveness in promoting efficient allocation of resources. Both therefore reduce the benefits gained from a rule imposing
liability on such a successor. The existence of such a rule will, to the extent that it is to be applied in the future states of nature represented by
these two kinds of unaccounted for situations, have absolutely no influence on the firm's production decisions.
Dropping the equal information assumption also means that a successor liability rule will have additional costs not associated with producer liability. Potential successors, being less informed, will be likely to
view the risk of loss as having a greater variance and hence will typically
view bearing the risk as more costly than the selling producer does. Requiring the successor to bear liability will thus prevent some transfers of
assets into more productive hands.
Thus, for any given activity and associated harm, the case for imposing liability on a corporate successor in order to promote efficient allocation of resources is not as powerful as it is for imposing it on P.117 The
benefit is less and the cost is greater. A societal determination imposing
strict liability on producers for such an activity should not, therefore, automatically imply that liability should be imposed as well on a successor
corporation such as S.118
Nothing in this discussion says that there should not be successor
liability with respect to the activity in question. It simply argues against
presumptions in favor of succesor liability based on the reasons put forward for producer liability. It also provides certain guides.
For example, the efficient risk allocation argument for imposing strict
liability on producers carries through to successors more robustly than
does the efficient resources allocation argument. Therefore, where risk allocation is stressed as the justification for imposing strict liability on producers for a particular activity, the case for imposing it on successors is
stronger.
Another important factor in determining the appropriateness of successor liability for a given activity involves differences in the expected
level of information concerning liability risks between potential sellers
and buyers of corporate assets. The less potential buyers know initially
and the greater their difficulty gathering information, the greater will be
57. As for risk, the only failure to account that matters is the one regarding the possibility of acts generating liability. By casting doubt on the idea the it is ex ante risk rather
than ex post loss that is being allocated, this failure undermines equally the efficient risk
allocation rationale for imposing liability on P and on S.
58. The modem products liability cases that expand successor liability beyond the
traditional four exceptions to the general no successor liability rule are typically premised
on the idea that the basic justifications of strict liability call for successor liability as well
when the predecessor is no longer available to pay. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 3132, 560 P.2d 3, 9 (1977).
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the difference in the variance estimates of buyers and sellers and hence in
their respective costs of bearing the risk. Thus, substantial information
disparities weaken the case for successor liability. Imposing successor liability where the information differences are particularly large will block a
particularly large number of asset transfers to more productive hands.
Similarly, the larger the amount of liability relative to the size of the
typical transaction, the more that an information difference between potential sellers and buyers will deter asset transfers to more productive
hands if successor liability is imposed.
The discussion also suggests the irrelevance of the criteria developed
in the modern cases for expansion of successor liability in the products
liability area beyond the traditional exceptions to the general rule of no
successor liability. The traditional exception imposing liability when the
successor is a mere continuation of the predecessor makes sense because
continuation necessarily involves the same management and shareholders.119 There is no possibility under these circumstances that assets are
moving to more productive hands, so a rule imposing successor liability
does not impede that process. However, where the continuation exception
is expanded to cover situations where the successor's shareholders, officers, and directors are different from the predecessors,60 the whole logic
of the exception is lost.
The same can be said for the growing line of cases that impose liability where the successor continues to produce the same or a similar line of
products.61 Broadening traditional liability rules to include successor corporations that employ the assets in a substantially similar way is no more
likely than the traditional rule to identify those situations where the
transfer is primarily motivated by a desire to shed liability. Nor does this
broadening help identify the kinds of transactions where the benefits
from successor liability are particularly clear. Instead, simply because
broader liability expands the number of potential transactions covered, it
will block a larger number of transfers of assets to more productive
hands.

B. The Case of CERCLA
1. Statement of the issue
CERCLA imposes strict liability on a wide range of actors for the
costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites. The liability provisions contained in section 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), identify as responsible parties: (1) current owners and operators of hazardous waste sites, (2) past
owners and operators of hazardous waste sites who were the owners or
operators at the time of the disposal, (3) persons who arrange for the
disposal of hazardous waste (generators), and (4) transporters of hazard59.
60.
61.
relevant

W. FLETCHER, supra note 55, § 7125, at 214.
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 {1st Cir. 1974).
The leading case is Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal. 3d at 34,560 P.2d at 8. For a review of the
cases, see Phillips, supra note 28.
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ous wastes. No express provision is made for the liability of corporate
successors to any of these parties.e:i
Notwithstanding the statutory silence, the EPA has taken the position that a corporate successor to any of the statutorily identified parties
is also liable under CERCLA if the successor continues substantially the
same business operations.68 Under the EPA's analysis, federal law should
determine whether a successor should be liable, not traditional state common law with its narrow exceptions to the general rule of corporate successor nonliability.64 In support of this proposition, the EPA cites the
congressional intent behind CERCLA to alleviate the vast national health
hazard created by inactive and abandoned disposal sites and the need for
national uniformity. 611 Citing a few cases involving regulatory statutes in
other areas, the EPA argues that the federal approach to this question is
to impose successor liability when there is continuity of business
enterprise.66
The few courts to have addressed the issue have accepted the concept that federal law should determine whether a successor should be liable, but none have adopted the EPA's position that liability should
extend to all sale-of-assets successors continuing substantially the same
business operations.67 In terms of judicial authority on the matter, there62. See Anspec v. Johnson Controls, 734 F. Supp. 793, 795 (E.D. Mich. 1989), appeal
dismissed, 891 F.2d 289 (1989) (corporate successors not statutorily specified, so not liable
until Congress writes § 107 to include them).
The imposition of liability on both current and previous owners and operators under §
I07(a) has corporate successor liability dimensions, but such dimensions are in fact ancillary
to the congressional intent. The statute does not impose liability upon all parties in the
chain of title, but only those connected temporally with the disposal (the previous owners)
and those who can be linked to either the cleanup under beneficiary status or liability under
public nuisance type principles.
63. See C. Price, EPA Memorandum: Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor Corporations Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA) 11, 15 (June 13, 1984) [hereinafter EPA Memorandum].
64. See supra note 55.
65. See EPA Memorandum, supra note 63, at 15 nn.40-41.
66. Id. at 15. However, the EPA admits that CERCLA is not primarily a regulatory
statute. Id.
67. The leading case that endorses the view that successor liability under CERCLA
should be determined by federal law is Smith Land & Improvement v. Celotex, 851 F.2d 86,
91-92 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1988). The facts of the case involved what
appeared to be a series of statutory mergers or consolidations. Id. at 90-91. The court was
persuaded that "Congress intended to impose successor liability on corporations which either have merged with or have consolidated with a corporation that is a responsible party as
defined in the Act." Id. at 92. However, since such a "successor" would be unambiguously
liable under even the most restrictive state corporate law, the court's conclusion tells us
little about the court's attitude about a sale of assets successor. In remanding the case, the
appellate court advised the district court to be guided by "the general doctrine of successor
liablity in operation in most states." Id. at 92. It should be noted that expansions of successor liability in the fashion advanced by the EPA have only been adopted by a small minority of states. See Note, EPA's Policy of Corporate Successor Liability Under CERCLA, 6
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 78, 94 (1986).
In Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit,
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fore, the application of CERCLA liability to corporate successors beyond
the narrow confines of traditional common law is at best an open
question.

2. Application of the general approach
If the federal courts ultimately expand CERCLA liability on successors beyond the traditional four exceptions to the general rule of no liability, it will not be due to clear congressional intent or overwelming
judicial authority at the state level. Judicial expansion will rather be an
exercise in public policymaking. The preceding discussion should help put
that exercise in perspective, by identifying what are and are not good arguments and focusing attention on some of the most salient factors.

a. Fairness considerations. At the outset, one should recognize that
there are some fairness based arguments for and against broader successor liability that are largely unpersuasive. To start, there is no way that a
sale-of-assets successor in an arm's-length deal can have benefitted from
the manner of disposal that gives rise to the predecessor's liability. Thus,
an argument that it is fair for the successor to be liable because it enjoyed
such a benefit is clearly invalid.68 In any non-fraudulent deal, the buyer
relying upon the Smith Land analysis, held that "the traditional rules of successor liability
in most states should govern" in asset sales. The court went on to set out the general rule of
nonliability subject to the traditional four exceptions. Id. at 1263. Because the product line
exception was not argued on appeal and the expanded continuing business enterprise exception would not apply to the facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit declined to decide the issue
of whether to adopt these expansions of successor liability that have been adopted by courts
of a few states in the products liability area. Id. at 1264 n.3, 1265.
In arguing that the "federal approach" is to impose successor liability where there is
continuity of business enterprise, the EPA relies heavily upon Oner II v. United States
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979). In Oner II, an asset sale successor was
required to pay a fine under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. The
fine was originally recommended by the EPA against the predecessor. Id. at 187. EPA Memorandum at 15. The Louisiana Pacific court explicitly distinguished Oner II because the
successor in Oner II had purchased with notice of a pending fine from the EPA (the same
individual having been president of the predecessor and the successor) and because the successor continued the operations giving rise to the violations. Louisiana Pacific, 909 F.2d at
1265-66. Imposition of successor liability in the Oner II case would thus appear to fit neatly
within the traditional exception of a transaction entered into in order to escape liability.
Thus, Oner II is fully consistent with the approach to the problem advocated here.
A review of other cases where successor liability has been found under CERCLA all fall
easily within the four traditional exceptions to the general non-liability rule. See generally
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mass. 1989) (liability
under CERCLA to successor of de facto merger); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co.,
739 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (successor liable as mere continuity of predecessor);
United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated, 855 F.2d
856 (1988) (successor liable under mere continuity and de facto merger analysis); Kelly v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (successor liable as mere continuation of predecessor corporation).
68. For example, the Smith Land court made this sort of argument. In dicta, it stated
that when a choice must be made between the taxpayers and the successor corporation, the
successor should bear the cost because the successor and its shareholders benefitted from
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will pay an amount equal to the value of what he receives; what the predecessor did or did not save by employing hazardous practices is irrelevant
to the deal. This result distinguishes the successor from each of the categories of responsible persons explicitly covered by the statute. Persons in
each of these categories can be in a position to profit from hazardous
practices.69 Imposing joint and several liability on the statutory group
while providing each member with rights of contribution can be regarded
as society's way of telling a group of persons to pay up and then sort out
responsibility among themselves. There is no logic that would put corporate successors within this group.
Second, there is no way that a corporate successor maximizing share
value can pass along to its current customers liability for its predecessor's
past acts.70 A liablity payment would be a fixed cost. Profits are maximized by choosing the level of output (with its corresponding price) at
which marginal cost equals marginal revenue, neither of which is affected
by fixed cost. This proposition is true whether the industry is competitive
or the successor has some degree of monopoly power. Thus it is invalid to
argue that imposing liability on a successor is fair because it will not
harm the successor but rather will retrieve money from a group-the customers-that benefitted in the past from the low prices that the use of
hazardous practices permitted. For the same reasons, it is invalid to argue
that imposing liability on a successor is a way of spreading losses over the
large number of persons constituting the successor's customers.
On the other hand, for any asset sales that occur after successor liability clearly becomes the rule, successors cannot argue that it is unfair
for them to have to pay. They receive ex ante compensation by paying a
lower purchase price in exchange for bearing the risk of liability. The burden of the rule thus falls on the statutory party predecessor, where it
would have been anyway absent the predecessor's sale of assets and dissolution. Thus, the important question is whether placing liability on successors is a good rule for shaping ongoing behavior, not whether it is fair
or not. 71
the manner of disposal. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
69. For any given disposal occurring prior to the passage of CERCLA in 1980, it is an
open question whether even any of the statutory parties made supernormal profits from
engaging in a hazardous practice. If the practice was legal and ordinary, all competitors
would have experienced the same savings and would have been forced by market pressures
to pass these savings on to their customers. For the same reasons (discussed in the text just
below) that successors, if liable, cannot pass on CERCLA liability for past disposals on to
their current customers, the statutory parties cannot pass these costs on either. Thus it is
the statutory parties' shareholders who ultimately are asked to pay for the cleanup of toxic
wastes even though they did not benefit from the past practices. Arguably, then, imposing
liability on the statutory parties for pre-1980 disposals may simply be an arbitrary choice of
a small subgroup to pay for a cleanup that is desired by a broad portion of society.
70. The analysis here applies equally to a firm seeking to maximize managerial cash
flow. For a discussion of managerial cash flow, see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
71. The question of the fairness of imposing successor liability on successors who purchased their assets before successor liability clearly became the rule is complicated. On the
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b. Efficiency considerations. Applying the general approach, the
:first thing to observe is that to the extent that the passage of CERCLA
represents a societal determination that imposing liability on the statutorily named parties promotes the efficient allocation of resources and risk,
there should be no presumption that this determination carries over to
successors in a sale of assets/dissolution scenario. In the Smith Land
case, the Third Circuit stated that "[c]ongressional intent supports the
conclusion that, when choosing between the taxpayer or a successor corporation, the successor should bear the cost."72 Given that the legislative
history is silent about successor liability,73 the only statements to which
the court could have been alluding concern a preference to have the statutory parties pay rather than the taxpayer. The extension to include successors is unwarranted.
Nevertheless, the general approach suggests that a rule imposing successor liability with respect to a given activity does yield benefits in terms
of promoting efficient allocation of resources and risk. How great those
benefits are depends on the extent to which management is aware of both
the chance of liability and the chance of a sale of assets/dissolution scenario. There is evidence that it is particularly difficult for both individuals
and organizations to process and take account of risks that are remote in
terms of probability and time.74 Thus, a rough comparison between the
remoteness of a typical products liablity claim and a CERCLA claim
would be helpful in deciding whether the case for successor liability under
CERCLA is stronger than with products liability.
One special feature of CERCLA is important. In the absence of a
private party paying for the cleanup, it will be paid for out of the
"Superfund," which is primarily funded by taxes on the chemical feedone hand, it can be argued that these transitional problems are an inevitable feature of an
evolving legal system and should not dictate substantive results. When parties enter into
transactions, they know that one of the risks they face is the risk of legal change and they
should not complain if it happens. In fact, parties' responses to the risk of legal change can
be socially beneficial: As the case for a new rule becomes more compelling, parties start to
behave as if the rule were firmly in place. See generally Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REv. 509 (1986).
On the other hand, with respect to disposals that occurred prior to the Act in 1980, it is
arguably quite arbitrary to place liability even on the statutory parties. See supra note 69.
Placing liability without notice on successors as well seems to compound that arbitrariness.
The questions of whether it is appropriate to select out a small subgroup-the shareholders of the statutory parties-to pay for a program desired by a broad portion of society
and whether it is legitimate in the transition period to expand the group to include shareholders of successors as well are beyond the scope of this article. The focus of this discussion
is on the Act as an ongoing influence on behavior. This focus seems more important since it
is unlikely that the courts will adopt different rules for successors with respect to pre- and
post-1980 disposals, and the post-1980 disposals over time will become the dominant subject
of litigation.
72. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
73. Id. at 91.
74. For an analysis of literature on individual and corporate handling of information
concerning latent and remote risks, see Gillette & Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U.
PA. L. REv. 1027, 1036-42 (1990).
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stocks and petroleum industries (the producers of the materials that are
the ultimate sources of most toxic wastes). While Congress has clearly
expressed a preference for private funding by the statutory parties, the
existence of a government fund that can very effectively share risk makes
the allocation of risk case for extending liability to successors less
compelling.
On the cost side, the general approach suggests focusing on two factors. The first is information differences concerning liability risks between
potential sellers and potential buyers of corporate assets. There is some
reason to believe that these differences may be very large in the case of
CERCLA type risks. Unlike products liability risks, where at least both
parties know that the product is in the hands of the public and the product itself is easily open to examination, CERCLA liability may arise from
an association with a third party and involve a dump owned by a fourth.
Even if a buyer can trace these connections and is allowed to make tests,
the costs are substantial. Thus, while potential buyers know that almost
any asset acquisition today can involve a CERCLA risk, it is very hard to
get a clear picture of the risk's dimensions.
The second cost factor is the size of the possible damage compared to
the size of the acquisition. CERCLA claims have the tendency to be totally unrelated to, and potentially much larger than, the value of the assets acquired. Thus, this factor also suggests that the cost of a rule
imposing successor liablity for CERCLA claims might, in terms of the
rule's effect on the transfer of assets to more productive hands, be unusually high.
CONCLUSION

Federal courts have viewed as their task the development of a federal
common law concerning the extent to which CERCLA liability should be
imposed on sale of assets/dissolution successors.7 i:; The general approach
that I have developed here cannot, given the practical impediments to
gathering the necessary data on benefits and costs, provide a definitive
answer to what the federal courts should do. The behavior of state courts
developing a common law of successor liability in the products liability
area forms some kind of base line, however. Measured against this base
line, the case for vigorous expansion of successor liability in the CERCLA
area seems weak. In a number of ways, the benefits of successor liability
seem smaller and the cost greater.
Of course, notwithstanding the general claims for the efficiency of the
common law, state courts may have gotten it wrong and expansion of successor liability in both the environmental and products liability areas may
be warranted. If the federal courts do choose to expand successor liability
. under CERCLA, they should do so in a different direction than the most
adventurous state courts have taken. Expansions that widen the traditional continuation exception to cover cases where management and
75. See, e.g., Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91; Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909
F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990).
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shareholders have changed or that create an exception where the successor continues the same product line bear no rational relation to the benefits and costs of successor liability and hence to what the strongest classes
of cases for imposing liability are. In the absence of the radical step of
simply imposing successor liability generally, a more fruitful line of expansion might be to put a burden on the buyer to show that, after exercising due diligence, he did not know of impending liability. Such a rule
would provide some capacity to discriminate between transactions motivated primarily to shed liability and those motivated primarily to move
assets into more productive hands.

